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THE CVILJURY trial is fast disappearing from our legal landscape, '
and one important reason for its disappearance is the rapid growth of
mandatory arbitration.2 However, with few exceptions, lawyers, courts,
and commentators have failed to adequately consider constitutional
rights to a jury trial in determining the validity of arbitration clauses.
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1. Federal court statistics for 2000 show just 1.21% of cases terminating in a jury
verdict. See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form, at
http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm (last accessed Nov. 5, 2003) (search vari-
ables on file with author). Apparently the same phenomenon is occurring at the state level,
but with more variation. A chart provided by the Court Statistics Project for the National
Center for State Courts shows that among 25 states, the percentage of cases ending injury
trial ranged from Washington's low .35% to Rhode Island's high of 5.5%. The average in
the jurisdictions studied, including 25 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia,
was that .7% of litigated cases ended in a jury trial. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT'L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, STATE TRIAL & NON-TRIAL DISPOSITIONS (in progress 2003) (on file with
author). See also Chris Guthrie, Procedural Justice Research and the Paucity of Trials, 2002 J.
DISP. RESOL. 127, 129 n.22 (discussing sample of 1992 data showing that approximately 2%
of state court cases ended in jury verdict).
2. See Allstar Homes, Inc. v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 933 (Ala. 1997) (Cook, J., con-
curring) ("The reality is that contracts containing [arbitration] provisions appear with in-
creasing frequency in today's marketplace. As a result, consumers find it increasingly
difficult to acquire basic goods and services without forfeiting their rights to try before a
jury the common-law claims that may accrue to them.").
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This article will show that if an appropriate analysis were used, a signif-
icant number of mandatory arbitration clauses would be held invalid.
Companies providing a broad range of products and services are
now using small print contracts of adhesion to require their custom-
ers, employees, business partners, and others to resolve any future dis-
putes through binding arbitration, rather than through litigation. Buy
a house or car, open a bank account, obtain insurance, order a com-
puter, schedule termite extermination services, or secure a credit
card, and the odds are high that you will be "agreeing" to resolve all
related future disputes through arbitration.3 Arbitration is increas-
ingly being required by medical providers, 4 schools, 5 and was even
mandated for a Cheerios box mail-in. 6 One study showed that the "av-
erage Joe" in Los Angeles is now required to arbitrate disputes that
arise with respect to one-third of the major transactions in his life. 7
The rapid proliferation of mandatory arbitration has been quite
controversial. Numerous articles in the popular press have criticized
the practice as unfair,8 and most legal academics who have written on
the subject express negativity toward the mandatory imposition of ar-
bitration. 9 Many state and federal court judges have also voiced dis-
3. Many articles have collected examples of these kinds of cases. See, e.g., David S.
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Right Claims in
an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33;Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Consti-
tutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury
Trial, Separation ofPowers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1, 7-10 (1997); Elizabeth
G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury
Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Winter 2003), available in draft at http://
www.roscoepound.org/new/thornburg.pdf (last accessed Nov. 5, 2003).
4. See, e.g., Michelle Andrews, For Patients, Unpleasant Surprises in Arbitration, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, § 3, at 8.
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Farrell, Signer Beware: For-Profit Colleges Increasingly Use Arbitra-
tion Agreements to Prevent Lawsuits, 49 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 18, 2003, at A33.
6. Ellie Winninghoff, A Fair Fight? Arbitration May Not Always be in Your Best Interest,
CHI. TmB., Nov. 24, 1994, at Al.
7. Linda Demaine & Deborah Hensler, Only Another Forum: Substituting Arbitration for
the Courthouse in Consumer Disputes, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Winter 2003),
available in draft at http://www.roscoepound.org/new/demaine.pdf (last accessed Oct. 22,
2003).
8. See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, Private Justice; Millions are Losing Their Legal Rights; Su-
preme Court Forces Disputes from Court to Arbitration-A System with No Laws, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
7, 2001, at Al; Margaret Mannix, No Suits For You-Mad at a Firm? Arbitration Could be your
Only Recourse, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 7, 1999, at 58; Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in
Fine Print: "You Can't Sue Us", Arbitration Clauses Block Consumers from Taking Companies to
Court, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at Al; Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to
Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at Al.
9. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup.
CT. REV. 331 (1997); Schwartz, supra note 3; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking the Supreme Courts Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660-74
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gust with the process of mandatory arbitration.' 0 The critics attack
mandatory arbitration on a variety of grounds, including not only its
elimination of access to courts and juries," but also its actual or po-
tential lack of neutrality,1 2 high cost,13 diminution of claimants' reme-
dies, 14 elimination of class actions, 15 and curtailment of discovery. 16
Yet, mandatory arbitration persists because, at least thus far, the
Supreme Court has received it quite enthusiastically. Since the mid-
1980s the Supreme Court has issued numerous decisions stating that
arbitration should be looked upon with favor and that, with few excep-
tions, arbitration clauses should be enforced. 17 While recognizing that
some contracts imposing arbitration might be unconscionable or im-
permissible under particular federal laws, the Court has explained
that those seeking to attack arbitration on such grounds must present
evidence rather than merely speculate about future problems.' 8 Thus,
while federal and state courts have voided some of the most egregious
(1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. Rrv. 1017 (1996).
10. Often judges use quite colorful language to condemn the process. See, e.g., In re
Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (asserting that the stench of mandatory
arbitration "rises as a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the body politic"); Lytle v.
CitiFinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 658 n.8 (Pa. 2002) (observing that particular arbi-
tration clause at issue "reveals yet another vignette in the timeless and constant effort by
the haves to squeeze from the have nots even the last drop," and quoting a populist song to
illustrate the point).
11. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 3; see also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 9, at 402
(urging that the Supreme Court has trammeled democratic institutions).
12. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 9, at 684.
13. See, e.g., id. at 682-83; Lisa B. Bingham, Self Determination in Dispute System Design
and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Winter
2003), available in draft at http://www.roscoepound.org/new/bingham.pdf (last accessed
Nov. 5, 2003).
14. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 9, at 685-86; Bingham, supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2002).
16. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 3, at 61.
17. I recount this history in Sternlight, supra note 9.
18. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (rejecting
claim that arbitration was unduly expensive on ground that plaintiff had failed to present
sufficient evidence of cost); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-33
(1991) (rejecting brokerage employee's claim that arbitration would be biased or unfair
on ground that employee failed to present sufficient evidence of problems with arbitra-
tion). An example of a case in which plaintiffs successfully presented sufficient evidence to
void an arbitration clause on grounds of unconscionability is Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp.
2d 902, 929-34 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding the arbitration provision illegal and unconscion-
able given its limitation of remedies, elimination of class actions, and other problems),
affd in relevant part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
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arbitration clauses.on statutory or common law grounds,' 9 most arbi-
tration clauses are upheld.
Nor has legislation significantly reined in mandatory arbitration.
At the federal level, although numerous bills have been introduced to
proscribe arbitration of particular claims, the only one that has been
enacted protects automobile franchisees from arbitration imposed by
automobile franchisors. 20 With respect to state law, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act in such a way as to
preempt most legislation that states might think to pass prohibiting
the use of mandatory arbitration with respect to certain kinds of
claims. 21
Although one of the most significant aspects of mandatory arbi-
tration is that it denies claimants access to court or to a jury trial, law-
yers, courts, and policy makers have typically failed to pay sufficient
attention to jury trial guarantees. 22 This diminution of the right to a
jury trial is especially surprising in light of the reverence traditionally
accorded the jury right. The Supreme Court has repeatedly praised
the civil jury trial, stating, for example, that "[t]he trial by jury is justly
dear to the American people. It has always been an object of deep
interest and solicitude, and every encroachment upon it has been
watched with great jealousy."23 As the Montana Supreme Court put it,
"the importance of the right of trial by jury derives from it having
'developed in harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic soci-
19. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Crane Int'l, 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003) (voiding,
as unconscionable, clause that shortened employees' statute of limitations to thirty days
and limited their parenthetical claims for relief); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs. Inc.,
134 F.3d 1054, 1060 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing to compel arbitration of Title VII claims
when arbitrator was precluded from awarding compensation damages); State ex rel Dunlap
v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 280 (W.Va. 2002) (voiding, as unconscionable, arbitration clause
imposed on jewelry customer where clause prohibited punitive damages or proceeding by
way of class action).
20. The Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001 was signed
into law as part of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835-36 (2002).
21. See infra Part II.C for further discussion of the preemption issue.
22. Insufficient attention has also been afforded to "access to court" provisions con-
tained in many states' constitutions. However, consideration of these arguments is outside
the scope of this article. For an example of a decision rejecting the "access to court" argu-
ment, see Rollings v. Thermodyne Industries Inc., 910 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1996) (holding, with
respect to private commercial contract, that agreement to arbitrate did not violate
Oklahoma constitutional provisions guaranteeing access to court).
23. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 581
(1990) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (Story, J.)).
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ety and a representative government.' 24 To quote William Black-
stone, trial by jury is "a privilege of the highest and most beneficial
nature. '25 As Blackstone also observed, in remarks very apt for our
situation today:
[Our liberties] cannot but subsist, so long as this palladium re-
mains sacred and inviolate, not only from all open attacks, which
none will be so hardy as to make, but also from all secret machina-
tions which may sap and undermine it.2 6
Thus, we have traditionally valued the jury trial for providing a
fair hearing by one's peers, for fostering the use of common sense, for
limiting the power ofjudges, and for providing jurors themselves with
an important civic educational experience. Yet, the imposition of
mandatory arbitration eliminates the civil jury, and often this elimina-
tion is not made through a knowing, voluntary, or intelligent waiver.
The remainder of this paper will discuss the implication of jury trial
rights for mandatory arbitration under both the federal and state con-
stitutions, but will focus primarily on state constitutional rights as I
have previously examined the federal right in some detail. 27
I. The Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
The Constitutional right to ajury trial has long been deemed one
of the fundamental elements of our federal system of justice. Ratified
in 1791, the Seventh Amendment provides that "in Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right tojury trial shall be preserved." 28 Of course, the Seventh Amend-
ment only applies to certain kinds of claims. First, it only applies to
those cases brought "at common law" for more than twenty dollars. 29
Second, at least to date, the Seventh Amendment has been held by
the Supreme Court to apply only in federal and not state courts. While
the Court has not, in any recent cases, held that the Seventh Amend-
24. Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 12 (Mont. 2002) (quoting State v.
LaMere, 2 P.3d 204, 211-12 (Mont. 2000)) (Nelson and majority of court specially
concurring).
25. 3 WILLIAM BAc.KSTONE, COMMENTARIES *350.
26. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343.
27. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial 16 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 669 (2001).
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
29. To determine if a particular claim is brought "at common law," courts first per-
form a historical analysis to decide whether the claim would have entitled parties to a jury
in eighteenth-century England. Then, if that test is inconclusive, courts look at whether the
remedy that is sought is legal as opposed to equitable. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers,
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 581 (1990) (finding plaintiff entitled to ajury trial in
duty of fair representation action brought against union).
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ment does not apply in state court, the Court's most recent decision
on this point reveals that, to date, the Seventh Amendment is one of
the very few provisions of the Bill of Rights that has not been "incor-
porated" into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause and ap-
plied to the states.30
The fact that the Seventh Amendment has not been deemed suf-
ficiently fundamental to our system of justice to be incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment is troubling. Indeed, the refusal to incor-
porate, if maintained, creates tension with the Court's statements re-
garding the fundamental nature of the jury trial. Nonetheless, for
purposes of this article I do not argue for incorporation, but rather
assume that the Seventh Amendment governs only proceedings in
federal court and that state constitutions will govern actions brought
in state court.3 1
When the Seventh Amendment does apply, the right to jury trial
may be waived, but federal courts typically hold that such waivers must
be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, or words to the same effect.3 2
To determine whether a knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver has
been made, federal courts look at such factors as the negotiability of
the waiver, the conspicuousness of the waiver, the disparity of bargain-
ing power between the parties, and the degree of professional or busi-
ness sophistication on the part of the party opposing waiver.33 Courts
often place the burden of proof on those parties asserting that the
jury trial right has been waived.3 4
Given this analysis, one might assume that the existence of a Sev-
enth Amendment jury trial right would provide a significant shield
against the imposition of mandatory arbitration, but one would be
wrong. At least to date, the jury trial right has provided scant protec-
tion from mandatory arbitration. How can this be? First, for the most
part, federal courts have not even considered jury trial rights when
examining the viability of arbitration clauses. 35 Instead, ignoring any
special jury trial waiver standards, courts have typically done an ordi-
30. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916). See generally
Richard C. Reuben, ADR and the Troubling Seventh Amendment: A Modern Case for
Incorporation (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
31. A strong argument for incorporation is presented in Reuben, supra note 30.
32. For a detailed discussion of this body of case law, see Sternlight, supra note 27, at
678-90. For a recent federal case setting out this standard, see Medical Air Technology Corp.
v. Marwan Investment Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002).
33. Med. Air Tech., 303 F.3d at 18-19.
34. Sternlight, supra note 27, at 690.
35. Federal court judges are not solely responsible for this failure. Plaintiffs' counsel
have likely failed to make strong jury trial arguments in many cases.
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nary contractual analysis and simply considered whether there was an
agreement to arbitrate, whether it covered the dispute in question,
and whether it was void for contractual reasons such as unconsciona-
bility or fraud. 36 Second, to the extent federal courts have considered
jury trial waiver arguments in evaluating arbitration clauses, they have
usually found they are not relevant to arbitration. For example, a few
courts have recognized that a contract to arbitrate waives the jury trial
right, but have not then explained their failure to apply the tradi-
tional jury trial waiver criteria. 37 Some have relied on the principle
that arbitration is "favored," to reject jury trial arguments, without
considering that any favoritism entailed in a federal statute might be
trumped by the Seventh Amendment.3 8
One line of federal cases does purport to address the jury trial
waiver argument more seriously, ultimately concluding that because
persons who accept arbitration obviously choose a forum in which no
jury trial is available, no jury trial waiver analysis need be performed.3 9
Yet, this analysis is clearly circular. If the acceptance of an alternative
forum waives jury trial rights, then courts should use appropriate jury
trial waiver standards to determine whether in fact an alternative fo-
rum has been selected. 4 °
The only intellectually honest way to defend many federal courts'
refusal to apply a heightened jury trial waiver standard to arbitration is
to argue that reliance on civil jury trial waiver standards should be
abandoned not only in reviewing arbitration clauses but in all other
contexts as well. Professor Stephen Ware has taken precisely this ap-
proach. 4 ' Indeed, some lawyers have now urged companies to use a
36. Many such cases are discussed in Sternlight, supra note 27, at 696-710.
37. E.g., Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1155
n.12 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that "the Seventh Amendment does not preclude 'waiver' of
the right to jury trial through the signing of a valid arbitration agreement," but failing to
apply standard waiver criteria); United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Pub-
lishers, 708 F. Supp. 95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejectingjury trial claim but failing to consider
whether choice of arbitration was voluntary, knowing, or intelligent).
38. Burlington N. R.R. v. Soo Line R.R., 162 B.R. 207, 214 (D. Minn. 1993) (stating
that "if the Seventh Amendment presented a serious limitation on the duty to arbitrate,
arbitration provisions would have to be narrowly construed," and rejecting this possibility
in light of Supreme Court precedent).
39. The leading case making this point is Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 836 F.2d 310, 316-21 (7th Cir. 1987). Others include Bank One, N.A. v. Coates,
125 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Miss. 2001), aff'd, 2002 WL 663804 (5th Cir. 2002), Marsh v. First
USA Bank, N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909 (N.D. Tex. 2000), and Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1461 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
40. For a discussion and critique of these cases, see Sternlight, supra note 27, at 719-26.
41. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clause, Jury Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waiv-
ers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Winter 2003), available
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plain jury trial waiver, rather than an arbitration clause, to gain the
advantages of the waiver without what some companies may perceive
as the disadvantages of arbitration (for example, limited appeal or the
possibility of facing an arbitral class action) .42 Fortunately, it does not
seem likely that most courts are ready to allow persons to waive their
jury trial rights involuntarily, non-intelligently, or non-knowingly in all
contexts.
4 s
As I have argued elsewhere in greater detail,44 unless federal
courts are generally willing to abandon the Seventh Amendment
"knowing/voluntary/intelligent" civil jury trial waiver standard, they
need to significantly revise their approach to mandatory arbitration
clauses. While applying the appropriate standard in arbitration cases
will not result in the invalidation of all mandatory arbitration clauses,
it should cause the invalidation of those clauses that are imposed in
the most egregious fashion, to the extent that the claimants would
have otherwise possessed a Seventh Amendment jury trial right.4 5
II. Jury Trial Arguments in State Court
Most state constitutions protect the right to jury trial for certain
civil claims.46 Such clauses typically protect the rights to a civil jury
that existed at the time the state constitution was adopted. 47
in draft at http://www.roscoepound.org/new/ware.pdf (last accessed Oct. 22, 2003). Ware
asserts that there is no valid reason to protect persons against unknowing, unintelligent,
involuntary waivers of civil jury trial rights, and that standard contractual analyses should
be used that would permit waiver of the jury trial by way of a contract of adhesion. Id.
42. See Stephen F. Fink, Insist on Bench Trials, NAT'L. L.J., Jan. 13, 2003, at A17; Barry
M. Appell, Bench Trials May Prove Better for Employers than Arbitration, S.F. DuLvJ., Apr. 24,
2003, at 5.
43. While a few courts appear ready to allow commercial entities to waive their jury
trial rights involuntarily, unknowingly, or non-intelligently, I have not found any courts
willing to apply this standard to most consumers or employees outside the arbitration
context.
44. See Sternlight, supra note 27, at 727-29.
45. Id. One federal district court recently applied the Seventh Amendment in the
manner I am advocating. See Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., No. 3:02-1078,
2003 VAL 22533457 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 2, 2003) at *14-15 (finding arbitration clause im-
posed on restaurant chain employees invalid in part because there is "strong evidence that
plaintiffs cannot be compelled to arbitrate their claims because they did not knowingly and
voluntarily waiver their constitutional right to a jury trial").
46. SeeJay M. Zitter, Annotation, Contractual Juiy Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42
A.L.R. 5th 53 (1996); see also Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh
Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1040 n.ll (1999) (stating that all fifty states provide for
preservation of the jury trial right, in certain kinds of cases, either by constitution or by
statute).
47. See, e.g., Lisanti v. Alamo Title Ins. of Tex., 55 P.3d 962 (N.M. 2002).
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State courts, like federal courts, have typically held that the civil
jury trial right is waivable. While the specific waiver standards differ
from state to state, most state courts follow the federal formulation
that the waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.48 Like the
federal courts, state courts usually consider the clarity and conspicu-
ousness of the waiver, the degree to which it was negotiable, and the
relative bargaining power and sophistication of the parties.49 Thus,
while civil jury trial waivers are often enforced in commercial con-
tracts, 50 they are often rejected if imposed on a weaker consumer by a
stronger party. 5
1
48. For a general discussion of waiver standards in the fifty states, see Zitter, supra
note 46. Examples of state court cases setting out this standard include L & R Realty v.
Connecticut National Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 751-52 (Conn. 1998) (recognizing that jury trial
waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent but also stating that, in commercial as
opposed to consumer context, the written waiver provision is prima facie evidence of know-
ing, voluntary, intelligent waiver); Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624, 627
(Mo. 1997) (per curiam) ("[The] fundamental nature of the due process right to jury trial
demands that it be protected from an unknowing and involuntary waiver"); Gaylord Depart-
ment Stores of Alabama, Inc. v. Stephens, 404 So. 2d 586, 588 (Ala. 1981) (rejecting jury trial
waiver imposed on employee on grounds that it was not knowing and intelligent, and also
emphasizing bargaining inequity); Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-Graphics, Inc., 607 A.2d
703, 704-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding no proper waiver, in commercial context, be-
cause no knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver was shown); Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 885, 887 (Ct. App. 1991) ("We do not mean to imply that contractual
waivers of trial by jury will be upheld in all instances, or that such rights will be taken away
from a party who unknowingly signs a document purporting to exact a waiver. The right to
trial by jury in a civil case is a substantial one not lightly to be deemed waived."). But see
Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d 705, 708-09 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (failing
to use knowing, voluntary test, and contrasting federal courts' treatment ofjury trial waiv-
ers, but nonetheless recognizing importance of bargaining inequities).
49. See, e.g., Gaylord Dept. Stores, 404 So. 2d at 588 (concluding that ajury trial waiver
contained in the employment agreement between a pharmacist and a department store
was not valid because it was buried in paragraph thirty-four of the agreement and also due
to the disparity in bargaining power); Fairfield Leasing Corp., 607 A.2d at 704 (refusing to
find proper waiver, in contract between two commercial entities). To the extent that a state
imposed tougher waiver standards than those imposed by the Seventh Amendment, the
state rule would apply.
50. See, e.g., Trizec, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (enforcing jury trial waiver contained in com-
mercial lease given clear unambiguous language and given commercial as opposed to con-
sumer context); L & R Realty, 715 A.2d at 751-52 (upholding waiver by commercial
borrower and noting that in commercial context, intent can be inferred from the language
of the waiver).
51. At the extreme, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that all pre-dispute agree-
ments to waive ajury trial are unenforceable under the Georgia Constitution and statutes.
Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994). Interestingly and inexplicably,
however, this prohibition has not been applied to arbitration clauses. Id. at 800 n.5 (citing
statute governing enforcement of arbitration provisions).
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A. How Have Jury Trial Arguments Affected State Courts'
Examination of Arbitration Clauses?
As in federal arbitration cases, the right to a jury trial is men-
tioned in a fair number of state court arbitration appeals as well. Un-
fortunately, like the federal courts, state courts rarely examine the jury
trial right argument in a full fashion. Jury trial arguments have arisen
in state court cases in two different contexts: (1) state statutes mandat-
ing use of arbitration for certain kinds of claims; and (2) private con-
tracts requiring the use of arbitration.
1. Cases That Rely on Jury Trial Concerns to Reject Mandatory
Arbitration
The most extensive consideration of whether a contractually im-
posed arbitration clause violated a state constitutional right to jury
trial was given by the Montana Supreme Court in Kloss v. Edward D.
Jones & Co. 52 The case involved a claim brought by an elderly investor
against a securities brokerage firm. Justice Nelson's special concur-
rence, joined by three other Justices from the seven member court,
found that the right to jury trial afforded by the Montana Constitu-
tion 53 was "fundamental, ' '5 4 and therefore could only be waived "vol-
untarily, knowingly and intelligently. '55 Listing a host of factors to be
considered in determining whether this test was met, such as the con-
spicuousness of the waiver and the extent to which the waiver was ne-
gotiable,5 6 the concurrence went on to conclude that "there is no
evidence to support a conclusion that Kloss knowingly and intelli-
gently waived her right[ ] to trial by jury. . . when she executed ...
52. 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., specially concurring). An older California
appellate level case also rejected an arbitration clause, imposed by an attorney on his cli-
ent, on the ground that the client was not sufficiently apprised of the fact that she was
waiving her jury trial right. Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson, 256 Cal. Rptr. 6, 9-10 (Cal.
App. 1989). Cf Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 265, 269
(Cal. App. 1997) (refusing to use jury trial grounds to void arbitration clause imposed on
client by attorney).
53. Article II, section 26 of Montana's constitution provides that "[t]he right of trial
by jury is secured to all and shall remain inviolate." MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 26.
54. Kloss, 54 P.3d at 12. The opinion also asserted that the right of access to court is
fundamental, while recognizing that not all prior Montana courts had so held. Id. at 12-14.
55. Id. at 15. The court further stated that "[flora fundamental right to be effectively
waived, the individual must be informed of the consequences before personally consenting
to the waiver," and that "the waiver will be narrowly construed." Id.
56. Id.
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standard-form contracts containing the arbitration clauses. 57 As will
be discussed in more detail later, the Montana opinion also rejected
an argument that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the state
constitutional jury trial guarantee. 58
In two other cases, state supreme courts struck down arbitration
that was imposed by statute because of jury trial infringements. In
Lisanti v. Alamo Title Insurance of Texas, 59 the New Mexico Supreme
Court relied on the state constitutional right to jury trial to invalidate
mandatory arbitration of certain insurance claims imposed by statute
and state regulation. 60 The insureds argued that the New Mexico con-
stitution entitled them to a jury trial for their non-statutory claims,
and the supreme court agreed. It found that the claims were essen-
tially breach of contract allegations, to which a jury trial should at-
tach.6t The court then went on to consider whether the insureds
waived their jury trial right when they chose to purchase title insur-
ance, and concluded they did not because the arbitration was not vol-
untary, but rather mandated by regulation. 62 While the Court did not
spell out the standards by which waiver should be determined, it
clearly had no problem concluding that arbitration imposed by regu-
lation did not amount to a voluntary relinquishment of the jury trial. 63
57. Id. The opinion emphasized that there was no evidence plaintiff actually negoti-
ated the clause, that she had the assistance of counsel, or that she had the same level of
knowledge and sophistication as the representative of the brokerage. Id.
58. Id. at 15-16. See infra text accompanying notes 113-16.
59. 55 P.3d 962 (N.M. 2002).
60. Id. at 964. The court found that N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-30-4(A) (Michie 1985)
provided the superintendent of insurance with authority to promulgate rules and regula-
tions, and that the superintendent had used this authority to require arbitration of title
insurance claims for under $1,000,000. Id.
61. Lisanti, 55 P.3d at 964-65. In so ruling, the court rejected the insurance com-
pany's argument that "because the specific right to sue under a title insurance policy did
not exist in the territorial period, it is not a right for which ajury trial is guaranteed." Id. at
965. The court explained that what is relevant is the type of cause of action, breach of
contract, rather than the specific subject matter of the claim. "It is unreasonable... to say
that no jury trial right attaches to a breach of contract claim concerning the purchase of a
computer simply because computers did not exist when the New Mexico Constitution was
adopted." Id.
62. Id. at 966. "Because the decision to arbitrate the disputes could not be voluntarily
accepted or rejected, we think the Court of Appeals was correct to reject Alamo's argument
that the Lisantis waived the right to trial by jury." Id.
63. Id. Lisanti also rejected the defendant's argument that the state was entitled to
eliminate the jury trial because plaintiffs were pursuing a "public right" as to which the
legislature could determine the appropriate remedy. Id. at 966-68 (discussing Atlas Roofing
Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977) and
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S: 33 (1989), but concluding that Lisantis' claim was
private in nature).
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Similarly, in Williams v. Williams,6 4 the Nevada Supreme Court held
that a statute requiring arbitration of certain motor vehicle claims in-
fringed on the jury trial right because the arbitration was imposed
involuntarily.65
Also, in Badie v. Bank of America,6 6 a California appellate court did
not perform a full jury trial analysis. Specifically, that court explained
that because an agreement to arbitration amounts to a waiver of the
state constitution's right to ajury trial,6 7 an arbitration clause is invalid
where the ambiguity of the clause makes it unclear that the party
agreed to arbitration. 68 The court explained:
In order to be enforceable, a contractual waiver of the right to a
jury trial must be clearly apparent in the contract and its language
must be unambiguous and unequivocal, leaving no room for doubt
as to the intention of the parties .... Although an effective waiver,
particularly in a non-adhesive contract, need not expressly state, "I
waive my right to a jury trial" or words to that effect, it must clearly
and unambiguously show that the party has agreed to resolve dis-
putes in a forum other than the judicial one.69
The Badie court found that a provision that merely authorized the
bank to make future changes in the agreement was not sufficient to
allow the bank to impose arbitration on its customers. 70
Several other state courts have cited to jury trial rights in refusing
to enforce arbitration clauses, but have referred to the jury right
largely in dictum or rhetoric rather than including it as support for
the actual holding. For example, in Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoe-
nix, Ltd.,7 1 the Arizona Supreme Court rejected an arbitration clause
contained in an adhesion contract on the ground that it fell outside
64. 877 P.2d 1081 (Nev. 1994).
65. Id. at 1083 (finding violation ofjury trial right afforded by NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3);
see also Obstetrics & Gynecologists v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Nev. 1985) (holding
unenforceable arbitration imposed on patient by doctor, where there was no "knowing
consent," but failing to explicitly mention jury trial rights).
66. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998).
67. Id. at 289.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also Buckner v. Tamerin, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2002) (con-
cluding father lacked power to waive adult child's right to jury trial by agreeing to arbitra-
tion); Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc., No. E2002-01321-COA-RV-CV, 2003
IAL 465775, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2003) (refusing to enforce clause imposed on
nursing home resident where clause was contained on page ten of eleven-page agreement,
where font size did not stand out, where arbitration was not fully explained, where agree-
ment was presented on take-it-or-leave-it basis, and where husband who signed clause had
obvious educational limits and no real bargaining power).
71. 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
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the plaintiffs reasonable expectations. However, in reaching that con-
clusion, the court emphasized that agreeing to arbitrate would waive a
jury trial: "Clearly, there was no conspicuous or explicit waiver of the
fundamental right to a jury trial or any evidence that such rights were
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived. The only evidence
presented compels a finding that waiver of such fundamental rights
was beyond the reasonable expectations of plaintiff. '72
Similarly, in Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp.,73 the Florida Supreme
Court interpreted an arbitration clause narrowly to mean that it did
not cover a wrongful death claim, and stated that the public policy
supporting jury trials was part of the reason for interpreting the clause
narrowly.74
2. Cases Upholding Arbitration After Considering Constitutional
Jury Trial Rights
The mere fact that a court upheld the imposition of arbitration
does not mean that it found a jury trial waiver analysis irrelevant.
Rather, some state courts have recognized that arbitration potentially
results in the loss of jury trial rights but found no reason to reject
arbitration in a particular case because the claimant never had a jury
trial right, or because the claimant in fact waived the jury trial right.
For example, in one line of cases courts have upheld statutorily
mandated arbitration on the ground that a claimant was seeking to
vindicate a public rather than a private right, and therefore could not
legitimately complain if the legislature replaced the jury trial with an
alternative remedy such as arbitration. One such case is Board of Educa-
tion v. Harrell,75 in which the New Mexico Supreme Court found that
the state employee was asserting a "public right" that could be re-
quired by the state to be resolved through arbitration. 76
72. Id. at 1017.
73. 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999).
74. See id. at 642 (stating that to deprive petitioners of jury trial and other constitu-
tional rights simply because they signed a contract containing an arbitration provision
"would clearly be unjust"). It should also be noted that a few decisions have considered jury
trial waivers under particular statutes. See, e.g., Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gyne-
cology Assocs., 773 A.2d 665 (N.J. 2001) (rejecting arbitration clause imposed on employee
on ground that employee did not knowingly waive jury trial right under New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination).
75. 882 P.2d 511 (N.M. 1994).
76. Id. at 523. The New Mexico court cited two Supreme Court cases that laid out this
doctrine: Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442
(1977), and Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). These cases and their prog-
eny permit Congress to send disputes involving public as opposed to private rights to be
Fall 2003] ARBITRATION SYMPOSIUM
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Although Bethany v. Public Employees Relations Board77 does not use
this exact analysis, it relies on similar logic in holding that the
Oklahoma constitution's jury trial provisions did not void a statutory
provision requiring public employees to resolve disputes through
binding arbitration. 78
Courts have also rejected jury trial arguments where the claimant
enjoyed no jury trial right in the first place, or to the extent the state
allows civil jury trial rights to be waived without requiring special con-
ditions. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a statute
requiring arbitration of certain insurance disputes did not violate a
state constitutional right to jury trial because there is no constitutional
right to a civil jury trial in Colorado. 79
Similarly, in Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,8 ° the California
Supreme Court considered whether an employee's jury trial rights
were waived when the group medical plan to which he subscribed
mandated that malpractice claims brought against it be arbitrated. 8'
The court found no jury trial problem, explaining "it has always been
understood without question that parties could eschewjury trial... by
agreeing to a method of resolving that controversy, such as arbitra-
tion, which does not invoke a judicial forum."8 2 The Court further
explained that the agreement to arbitration need not include an ex-
press jury trial waiver to be valid.83 To justify this conclusion, the court
resolved by administrative tribunals or other non-Article III judges. For a discussion of this
doctrine and its limits, see Sternlight, supra note 3, at 72-76.
77. 904 P.2d 604 (Okla. 1995).
78. See id. at 616. Analogizing to acts covering administrative procedures, government
tort claims, and workers' compensation, the court found that specialized adjudicative and
quasi-adjudicative regimes may be needed in particular situations. Id. at 614. This "logic," if
it is such, would not seem to extend to the private requirement that traditional private
claims such as breach of contract be resolved through arbitration rather than a jury trial.
Although Bethany mentioned that jury trial rights are waivable, and to some extent relied
on this proposition, id. at 615, it did not use a standard jury trial waiver analysis as this
article suggests it should have done.
79. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Broadnax, 827 P.2d 531 (Colo. 1992).
80. 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976). Note that Madden was subsequently distinguished on
another ground in Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 653 (Cal. 1985) (holding that
attorney did not have authority to bind client to arbitration).
81. Madden, 552 P.2d at 1187.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1187-88 ("But to predicate the legality of a consensual arbitration agree-
ment upon the parties' express waiver of jury trial would be as artificial as it would be
disastrous .... [T] here are literally thousands of commercial and labor contracts that pro-
vide for arbitration but do not contain express waivers ofjury trial. Courts have regularly
enforced such agreements .... Before today no one has so much as imagined that such
agreements are consequently invalid; to destroy their viability upon an extreme hypothesis
that they fail expressly to negative jury trials would be to frustrate the parties' interests and
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asserted that the standards for waiving a jury trial in the criminal con-
text do not generally apply to civil proceedings. 84
Sometimes it is unclear whether the court is employing a jury
waiver analysis. For instance, in Buraczynski v. Eyring, 5 although the
Tennessee Supreme Court did not state it was using a standard jury
trial waiver analysis, it effectively did so. While recognizing that the
arbitration clause imposed by a doctor on his patient would result in
the loss of ajury trial right, 6 the court nonetheless upheld the clause
because it was contained in a separate one-page document rather than
buried with other forms; because the patient was encouraged to dis-
cuss any questions about arbitration with the doctor; because the ret-
roactive aspect of the clause was separately initialed; and because the
clause could be revoked for any reason within thirty days.8 7 These are
many of the factors that a court would have considered in doing a full
jury trial waiver analysis.
3. Cases Failing to Adequately Consider Jury Trial Concerns in
Upholding Mandatory Arbitration Provisions
By way of contrast to the cases discussed above, which give at least
some consideration to constitutional jury trial rights in considering
whether arbitration clauses are valid, many courts have failed to thor-
oughly consider jury trial arguments. In some cases, although state
legislation mandated the use of arbitration to resolve particular dis-
putes, courts rejected jury trial challenges brought under the state
constitution. Typically, such cases have summarily stated that it was
appropriate for states to mandate the substitution of arbitration for
litigation as a condition of doing business.88 If a proper constitutional
destroy the sanctity of their mutual promises."); see also Powers v. Dickson, Carlson &
Campillo, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 265 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Madden to uphold validity of
arbitration mandated by attorney's retainer agreement with client, and stating that agree-
ment could be valid though it was not knowing).
84. Madden, 552 P.2d at 1187 n.12. Cf Trizec Props., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 280 Cal. Rptr.
885, 887 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding jury trial waiver contained in commercial lease but
stating that "[w]e do not mean to imply that contractual waivers of trial by jury will be
upheld in all instances, or that such rights will be taken away from a party who unknow-
ingly signs a document purporting to exact a waiver" and noting that "the waiver provision
must be clearly apparent in the contract and its language must be unambiguous and une-
quivocal, leaving no room for doubt as to the intention of the parties").
85. 919 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1996).
86. See id. at 320-21.
87. See id. at 321.
88. See, e.g., Reicks v. Farmers Commodities Corp., 474 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Iowa 1991)
(holding that constitutional jury trial is not compromised where commodities broker is
compelled, by federal regulation, to resolve claim through arbitration, where submission to
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analysis were applied, at least some of these cases would probably be
reversed, depending on whether a jury trial right would have other-
wise existed and whether the elimination of the right could be justi-
fied by special facts and circumstances.89
Other cases have failed to adequately consider jury trial argu-
ments in a contractual setting.90 In many of these cases, specifically
those in which the party challenging arbitration was a business that
entered a contract calling for arbitration, the court would likely have
upheld the constitutional validity of the arbitration provision even
had it applied a waiver test. That is, in those cases the court likely
would have found "knowing, voluntary, intelligent" waivers had it em-
ployed such a test because businesses are presumed to possess suffi-
cient bargaining power and business savvy such that an agreement to
arbitrate was consciously chosen. 9'
The most troubling cases that fail to properly consider jury trial
arguments are those that likely would have come out differently had a
proper waiver analysis been used. These are typically the cases that
involve less sophisticated parties such as consumers or lower level em-
arbitration is a condition of doing business as a commodities broker); Anderson v. Elliott,
555 A.2d 1042, 1047-49 (Me. 1989) (holding attorney's rights to jury trial are not violated
where state law requires him to submit to arbitration with respect to his fee); Lumbermen
Mut. Cas. Corp. v. Bay St. Truck Lease, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Mass. 1975) (holding
statutory imposition of arbitration as remedy for inter-insurer subrogation claims does not
violate jury trial rights, but failing to explain why not).
89. See Williams v. Williams, 877 P.2d 1081 (Nev. 1994). As noted earlier, supra note
63, a body of Supreme Court law distinguishes between claims of public right, which can
be sent to administrative or other processes, and claims of private right, which cannot.
90. See, e.g., Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 n.5 (Ga. 1994) (holding that
pre-litigation jury trial waivers are invalid but stating, in dictum, that pre-litigation agree-
ments to arbitrate may nonetheless be enforced); Graham v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 565 A.2d 908, 913 (Del. 1989) (upholding validity of arbitration clause contained in
insurance policy, even though insureds were never specifically informed of arbitration
clause and received a copy of the arbitration policy only after they had paid the premium
and the policy coverage had begun); Nordenstrom v. Swedberg, 143 N.W.2d 848, 857
(N.D. 1966) (concluding jury trial had been waived, in agreement to arbitration between
two businesses, without setting out specific waiver standards); Miller v. Two State Constr.
Co., 455 S.E.2d 678, 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that because arbitration is favored,
contract calling for arbitration between contractor and subcontractor does not violate con-
stitutional jury trial provision); DePalmo v. Schumacher Homes, Inc., No. 2001CA272,
2002 WL 253845, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002) (finding contractual waiver of jury
trial right in home purchaser's agreement to arbitrate, but without considering whether
jury waiver standard was met).
91. Examples of these less troubling cases include Nordenstrom, 143 N.W.2d at 857
(concluding jury trial had been waived, in agreement to arbitration between two busi-
nesses, without setting out specific waiver standards) and Miller, 455 S.E.2d at 680 (finding
that because arbitration is favored, contract calling for arbitration between contractor and
subcontractor does not violate constitutional jury trial provision).
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ployees who, significantly, were not represented by counsel at the time
they purportedly waived their jury trial rights. For example, in Graham
v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,92 the Delaware Supreme Court
found that the insureds, George and Mary Jane Graham, could be
compelled to arbitrate their uninsured motorist claim against State
Farm, despite the jury trial guarantee of the Delaware constitution. 93
The court permitted this waiver even though defendant admitted that
the Grahams "were never informed of the arbitration clause and re-
ceived a copy of the policy only after premiums had been paid and
coverage had begun,"94 and even though the court recognized that
any attempt to actually bargain over the clause would have been fu-
tile.95 Had a knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver standard been ap-
plied in this case, it might well have been decided differently. Given
the rapid proliferation of mandatory arbitration in the consumer and
employment realms, it is clear that many such cases will result in the
voiding of arbitration clauses once courts begin to use an appropriate
jury trial waiver analysis as discussed below.
B. How Should Jury Trial Arguments Affect State Courts'
Examination of Arbitration Clauses?
State courts should recognize, though many have not, that those
arbitration clauses that eliminate a pre-existing constitutional right to
jury trial should be treated like civil jury trial waivers interpreted
outside the arbitration context. Thus, to the extent that the state en-
forces civil jury trial waivers only if they are knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent, that same standard should be applied to arbitration
clauses. What does this mean, in practice, and what does it not mean?
I offer a simple three-part analysis.
First, a full jury trial waiver analysis is not required for all arbitra-
tion clauses. Instead, the state court must consider whether, absent
arbitration, ajury trial would have been required. If the claim is equi-
table in nature, or based on a new statutory right, ajury trial may not
have been appropriate in court, and thus ajury waiver analysis is inap-
propriate in such disputes over arbitration. To the extent that a partic-
ular jurisdiction does not provide a constitutional right to civil jury at
all, then obviously no jury trial waiver analysis should be performed.
92. 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 1989).
93. Id. at 911. The court recognized that Article I, section 4 of the Delaware Constitu-
tion "preserves the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law." Id.
94. Id. at 912.
95. Id. at 913.
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Second, assuming a jury trial right is at stake, the court must de-
termine what kind of waiver analysis is employed in the particular ju-
risdiction. If a given state allows the civil jury trial right to be waived
through a contract of adhesion, even if the waiver is not knowing,
voluntary, or intelligent, then that same standard should be applied to
arbitration clauses. 96 At the other extreme, if a given state provides
civil jury trial rights are not waivable at all in pre-dispute contracts,
then that same prohibition should be applied to arbitration clauses.
To the extent that the particular jurisdiction applies some version of
the "knowing, voluntary, intelligent" test to determine whether the
jury trial right has been waived, then that precise test should be ap-
plied to the arbitration clause.
Third, it is not appropriate for the court to "water down" the nor-
mal jury trial waiver analysis simply because it is examining an arbitra-
tion clause, rather than an ordinary jury trial waiver. This is where a
number of courts have gone astray. Noting that arbitration is "fa-
vored," some courts have hesitated or failed to apply the normal jury
trial waiver analysis to arbitration clauses.97 In Bank South, N.A. v. How-
ard98 the Georgia Supreme Court held that both the Georgia constitu-
tion and state statute prohibited pre-litigation jury trial waivers
altogether, and yet stated that pre-dispute arbitration clauses should
be allowed. 99 There is no logical defense for this lapse. The mere fact
that many courts look upon arbitration clauses favorably and enforce
them where appropriate does not mean that courts should go to the
extreme of enforcing an arbitration clause that trammels constitu-
tional rights. As will be discussed in the subsequent section, the pre-
emptive scope of the Federal Arbitration Act does not justify ignoring
ordinary state constitutional waiver provisions.
What would it mean, in practice, if state courts examined arbitra-
tion provisions under a traditional jury trial waiver standard? Notwith-
standing the apparent fears of some courts,100 it would not mean the
total demise of arbitration. Where two experienced companies know-
96. While I personally believe states should protect thejury trial against involuntary or
unknowing waiver in the litigation context, that is the subject for another article. My only
point here is that there is no valid reason for applying a different standard to arbitration
clauses than to other jury trial waivers.
97. Miller v. Two State Constr. Co., 455 S.E.2d 678, 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
98. 444 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1994).
99. Id. at 800 n.5 (relying on difference in legislative approach taken to arbitration as
compared to other jury trial waivers, but failing to explain why Georgia constitution would
not protect jury trial access from legislative infringement).
100. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1187 (Cal. 1976) (stating
it would be "disastrous" to apply a jury trial waiver standard to arbitration clauses).
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ingly and voluntarily agree to substitute arbitration for litigation, pre-
sumably any court in the country would accept that jury trial waiver,
and validly so under a jury waiver analysis. Similarly, where a sophisti-
cated employee or borrower knowledgeably agrees to resolve future
disputes through arbitration, again the clause would pass muster.10
But, where a company imposes arbitration on unsophisticated con-
sumers or employees and mandates the use of arbitration without giv-
ing them adequate notice or perhaps a chance to opt out of the
clause, some states' jury trial waiver standards should void such a pro-
vision. The fate of such a clause would depend upon both the specific
law of the jurisdiction and also the precise way in which the clause was
imposed. Was it clear and conspicuous? Was the individual knowl-
edgeable, sophisticated, or represented by counsel? Was the individ-
ual absolutely required to accept the arbitration? Was the individual
given a chance to negotiate the clause or to opt out of it altogether? In
at least some states, those companies that are interested in introduc-
ing arbitration to their consumers or employees will still be able to do
so, but the companies may have to change their procedures to make
them more fair. They may have to draft clearer clauses and perhaps
even give people a chance to decide whether or not they want arbitra-
tion. To my mind, at least, such reform would not be a bad thing.
C. The Preemption Question
It is well established that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
preempts certain state laws that are hostile to arbitration. Thus, it is
likely that as opponents of mandatory arbitration increasingly attempt
to use state constitutional jury trial rights to defeat some of those
clauses, defenders of mandatory arbitration will argue that the FAA
preempts reliance on state constitutional jury trial provisions. While
few court decisions have addressed this question thus far, I argue it
would be inappropriate to hold that the FAA preempts general jury
trial waiver provisions.10 2
Unfortunately, the scope of FAA preemption is not entirely
clear, although the Supreme Court has addressed it in several deci-
101. For an example of a case finding a sophisticated employee waived her right to a
jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally, even though she did not read the jury
waiver, see Brown v. Cushman & Wakefield, No. 2002 WL 1751269 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2002).
102. For further discussion of preemption concerns raised by the FAA, see David S.
Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act's Encroach-
ment on State Law (2003) (unpublished, on file with author).
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sions. 1 0 3 In these cases, the Court has made clear that while the FAA
does not occupy the entire field of arbitration, it does preempt those
state laws that would undermine the goals of the FAA.' 0 4 In particular,
two different kinds of state legislation are preempted.
First, the Court has held that states may not legislate that particu-
lar categories of claims are exempt from arbitration. 10 5 Second, in the
most recent Supreme Court preemption decision, Doctor's Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto,10 6 the Court held that the FAA preempted a Montana
statute requiring that arbitration clauses in franchise agreements be
"typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the con-
tract."'1 7 The Justices explained that "[c] ourts may not ... invalidate
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration
provisions."' 0 8
Thus, the Court has consistently contrasted general state laws re-
garding unconscionability or fraud, which clearly can be used to inval-
idate arbitration clauses, 10 9 and those state laws that substantively or
procedurally single out arbitration contracts for invalidation. To the
extent courts hold that only those state statutes or constitutions that
target arbitration are preempted, no problem is posed for the use of
jury trial waiver standards. Clearly those waiver standards are designed
to govern contracts in general, and not specifically to undermine arbi-
tration clauses.
However, some will likely seek to attack the use of the state consti-
tutional jury trial waiver standard by arguing that the preemptive
103. Most recently, in Green Tree Finiancial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003), de-
fendants argued for an extension of these preemption doctrines, suggesting that the FAA
should preempt South Carolina's willingness to allow an arbitration to proceed as a class
action. However, the Court failed to reach the preemption issue, instead simply conclud-
ing that the question of whether or not the contract allowed for an arbitral class action
should be decided by the arbitrator. Id. at 2408.
104. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989).
105. See generally Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995)
(invalidating Alabama statute prohibiting enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (holding that FAA preempted provision
of California labor law that had been interpreted to prohibit arbitration of wage collection
actions); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that the California
Franchise Investment Law was preempted to the extent it prohibited arbitration of claims
brought under that Act).
106. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
107. Id. at 683. The preempted provision was MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995).
108. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687.
109. As the Court has repeatedly observed, section 2 of the FAA explicitly allows states
to invalidate arbitration clauses "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for revoca-
tion of any contract." See, e.g., Doctor'sAssocs., 517 U.S. at 683; Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281;
Perry, 482 U.S. at 491; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16.
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scope of the FAA should be interpreted more broadly. °10 In particu-
lar, such defenders of mandatory arbitration may argue that jury trial
waiver provisions are not saved from preemption because they do not
apply generally to all kinds of contracts in a given state. These defend-
ers will cite a series of cases that arise in the franchise area, such as
Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc.I 1 In Bradley, the Ninth Circuit held that
a franchise law prohibiting the use of out-of-state venues was void to
the extent it applied to arbitration clauses, because the venue prohibi-
tion applied only to franchise agreements and not to contracts in
general. 12
In my view, however, it would be erroneous to interpret FAA pre-
emption so broadly as to exempt arbitration clauses from the standard
jury trial waiver analysis. The FAA does not preempt state jury trial
provisions because jury trial guarantees do not single out or target
arbitration clauses for elimination. 1 3 This is precisely the interpreta-
tion that was given by a majority of justices of the Montana Supreme
Court in Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co. 114 That court explained that
because Montana's law on contractual waiver of constitutional rights
applies in a variety of contexts, and not merely to arbitration clauses,
it is a general provision of Montana law and not preempted by the
FAA.' 1 5 In applying its general constitutional waiver rules to an arbi-
tration contract, the court was simply keeping arbitration on the same
footing as other contracts, rather than relegating it to an inferior posi-
tion. This interpretation makes sense as a matter of policy, in that
states are not seeking to invalidate arbitration clauses in general but
merely ensuring that waivers of constitutional rights are handled simi-
larly for arbitration clauses as they are for other contractual clauses.
Cases such as Bradley are wrongly decided in that they would pre-
empt any state statute or state constitutional provision that partially or
110. For a discussion of alternative preemption analyses, see Christopher R. Drahozal,
Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2004).
111. 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001).
112. Id. at 892. Several other courts issued similar decisions. See also OPE Int'l L.P. v.
Chet Morrison Contractors, Inc., 258 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding preempted, in
arbitration context, Louisiana statute invalidating contract provisions requiring litigation
or arbitration of any disputes outside of state); KKW Enters. v. GloriaJean's Gourmet Cof-
fees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding preempted, as to arbitra-
tion, a Rhode Island statute which renders unenforceable a provision in a franchise
agreement restricting jurisdiction or venue to a forum outside Rhode Island).
113. Schwartz, supra note 102, at 10, spells out this argument in greater detail, criticiz-
ing such decisions as Bradley as "incoherent."
114. 54 P.3d I (Mont. 2002).
115. Id. at 15-16 (majority of justices in concurring opinion).
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wholly invalidates an arbitration clause if the state provision does not
apply to all contracts in the state. As Professor Schwartz argues, the
Bradley approach is highly problematic because it voids virtually all
state laws that might invalidate arbitration clauses, since almost no
state law literally applies to all contracts.' 16 Although it is true that jury
trial waiver provisions do not literally apply to all contracts, in that
some contracts may not, for example, be worth enough money to cre-
ate ajury trial right,11 7 certainly the jury trial waiver standard covers a
broad range of contracts and is not targeted to the elimination of arbi-
tration.'l 8 From a practical standpoint, the vast majority of state stat-
utes and state constitutional provisions do not apply to all contracts in
a given state, but rather apply only to a particular category of situa-
tions. It makes no sense to preempt all provisions that are not so gen-
eral as to apply to every contract in the state when this is a virtually
impossible task for any provision to accomplish. 1 9
Conclusion
The civil jury trial has been part of our legal culture at both the
federal and state levels for many years. We have long held that while
the jury trial may be waived, the waiver must be knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. Companies' imposition of mandatory arbitration
against consumers, employees, and others now threatens the jury trial
right to the extent that courts fail to apply the traditional jury trial
waiver to mandatory arbitration provisions. If our society is to elimi-
nate the civil jury trial right we should do so in the open, following a
full public discussion. It is wrong to allow companies to use mandatory
arbitration clauses to surreptitiously eliminate this precious right. Fed-
eral and state court judges have a critical role to play in preventing
companies from using mandatory arbitration clauses to erode the pre-
cious right to jury trial.
116. Schwartz, supra note 102, at 8-10. As Schwartz explains, such an overextension of
the preemption doctrine is highly troubling not only because of its impact on arbitration,
but more generally because of its undercutting of the appropriate role of state legislatures
and state courts.
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
118. For an example of a decision rejecting the Bradley analysis, see Mitchell v. American
Fair Credit Association, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 201-02 (Ct. App. 2002) (upholding, against
preemption attack, signature requirement contained in California Services Act).
119. See Schwartz, supra note 102, at 8-10; Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconsciona-
bility After Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1031 n.210
(1996) (state statute is not preempted merely because it only applies to particular catego-
ries of contracts, rather than to every contract in the state).
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